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Abstract 
The Pakistan competition policy, as in many other countries, was originally designed to regulate 
business conduct in traditional markets and for tangible goods and services. However, the 
development and proliferation of the internet has led to the emergence of digital companies which 
have disrupted many sectors of the economy. These platforms provide digital infrastructure for a 
range of services including search engines, marketplaces, and social networking sites. The digital 
economy poses a myriad of challenges for competition authorities worldwide, especially with 
regard to digital mergers and acquisitions (M&As). While some jurisdictions such as the European 
Union and the United States have taken significant strides in regulating technological M&As, there 
is an increasing need for developing countries such as Pakistan to rethink their competition policy 
tools. This paper investigates whether merger reviews in the Pakistan digital market are informed 
by the same explanatory variables as in the traditional market, by performing an empirical 
comparative analysis of the Competition Commission of Pakistan’s (CCP’s) M&A decisions 
between 2014 and 2019. The findings indicate the CCP applies the same decision factors in 
reviewing both traditional and digital M&As. As such, this paper establishes a basis for igniting 
the policy and economic debate of regulating the digital platform industry in Pakistan. 
Key words: Digital platforms, competition law, digital mergers, political economy, data 
monopoly. 
 1Fatima S. Competition law in Pakistan: brief history, aspirations and 
characteristics. Commonwealth Law Bulletin, 2012; 38(1): 43-62.  
2 UNCTAD. Voluntary Peer Review of Competition Law and Policy: Pakistan Overview. 
Retrieved from UNCTAD. 2013. Available from:  
https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ditcclp2013d4_overview_en.pdf 
3 Wilson J. Crossing the Crossroads: Making Competition Law Effective in Pakistan. Loyola 
University Chicago International Law Review, 2011; 8(2). Available from: 
https://lawecommons.luc.edu/lucilr/vol8/iss2/2/ 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Until 2010, the principal competition legislation in Pakistan was the Monopolies and 
Restrictive Trade Practices Ordinance (MRTPO) 1. Designed to curb the undue concentration of 
economic power in the hands of a few and prevent restrictive trade practices, the MRTPO was an 
incomplete legal framework with insufficient substantive provisions. It’s enforcer, the Monopolies 
Control Authority (MCA) lacked the institutional and technical capacity to carry out its mandate 
2. The mushrooming government’s desire to attract foreign investment and increasing exposure to 
the challenges of global trade necessitated the modernization of the competition regime in 
Pakistan. The enactment and coming into force of the Competition Act (the Act) in 2010 was a 
significant step towards this end. The new legislation is based on international best practices and 
is modeled upon the competition provisions of the European Union, OECD (Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development), and UNCTAD (United Nations Commission for Trade 
and Development) 3. It also bestows greater legal and investigative powers to the Competition 
Commission of Pakistan (CCP or the Commission) by empowering it to exclusively enforce all 
“the rules, regulations, and guidelines, directives issued thereunder to ensure free competition in 
all spheres of commercial and economic activity to enhance economic efficiency and to protect 
consumers from anti-competitive behavior across Pakistan 2. 
The anti-competitive practices identified by the Act include abuse of dominant position, 
deceptive marketing, and agreements restricting competition. In relation to abuse of dominant 
position, Section 3, subsections 2 and 3 of the Act prohibits any practice that prevents, reduces, 
distorts, or eliminates competition in the relevant market. Such practices include unfair trading 
conditions (such as limiting production or unreasonable price increases), price discrimination, 
application of dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions, predatory pricing, refusal to deal, 
excluding, or boycotting another undertaking from producing, and tie-ins that restrict or render the 
sale of goods or services conditional on the purchase of other products or services. Additionally, 
the CCP General Enforcement Regulation 2007 provides that in its assessment of the competitive 
impacts of abuse of dominant position, the Commission may consider other measures such as 
market share, structural factors, and market power. 
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 The Act, together with the Competition (Merger Control) Regulations 2016 (the 
Merger Regulations) and CCP merger guidelines, address the review and approval of mergers. 
Section 11 of the Act prohibits mergers that would eliminate or substantially lessen competition 
by creating or strengthening a dominant position in the relevant market. Prior notification of 
proposed mergers and acquisitions that meet the notification thresholds is mandatory. Parties are 
required to make a pre-merger application to the CCP if the value of annual turnover or gross asses 
of the undertaking exceeds 300 million rupees, or the combined value of the acquirer and the 
target’s shares or the merging parties is more than 1 billion rupees. The Merger Regulations 
provide the merger procedures and exemption conditions. A merger can still be allowed even after 
failing the substantive test if it can be shown that (a) the merger will generate substantial economic 
efficiencies related to the production and/or distribution of goods and provision of services; (b) the 
economic efficiency from the merger significantly exceeds the adverse effects on competition, 
and; (c) such efficiency cannot be reasonably achieved by a less restrictive means of competition 
2. 
The regulations also outline the factors that the CCP should consider in the ex-ante 
assessment of mergers which include the level and trends of competition, ease of entry post-
merger, market characteristics, degree of countervailing power, vertical integration, level of 
import, removal of effective competitors, and failing firm. The remedies available to the CCP 
include prohibition of an intended merger, divestment of completed transactions, or partial 
divestment or prohibition 3. In addition to these remedies, Section 31 of the Act states that the 
Commission may, in the case of a merger, authorize the merger and stipulating the conditions 
which the acquisition is subject to, open a second phase review if it has doubts regarding the 
compatibility of the merger with the provisions of the law, or prohibit the merger after conducting 
a second phase review.  
Although the current competition law framework is sufficiently capacitated to deal with 
competition issues in Pakistan including M&As, the policy tools lean towards traditional business 
models. The emerging digital market presents a new set of challenges. Online platforms operate 
new business models that are designed to collect and process user data using complex algorithms. 
The features of online platforms such as non-price competition, data-driven network effects, and 
economies of scope and scale have challenged traditional competition theories and policies4. 
Within merger reviews, digital mergers present legal difficulties in the definition of the relevant 
market, in evaluating the competitive effects and network externalities of the new entity, and in 
assessing the impact of zero-priced goods in two-sided markets 4.
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Moreover, technology-based M&As raise informational and data protection issues 5. In recent 
years, Pakistan has witnessed a new digital wave, with hundreds of tech start-ups entering the 
market. The value of tech mergers, acquisitions, and venture capital investments increased 
exponentially in 2018, with a 61 percent year on year growth in funding. The country’s digital 
economy has attracted significant domestic and foreign investments including the acquisition of 
Foodpanda by Germany’s Hero in 2016, the $3.1 billion acquisition of the ride-hailing company 
Careem, by Uber, and Alibaba’s acquisition of the Pakistan’s leading online retailer, Daraz for an 
estimated $200 million 6. With increased digitalization of the Pakistani economy, it is imperative 
that the competition policy tools are adequately equipped to deal with the unique challenges posed 
by digital companies.  
2. The Specific Features of Digital Platforms 
Digital platforms are technologies that link two or more user groups and creates value by 
allowing transactions that otherwise would not occur, and at a minimum transactional cost 7. The 
definition for digital platforms provided by the European Commission is “an undertaking operating 
in two (or multi) sided markets, which uses the internet to enable interactions between two or more 
distinct but interdependent groups of users so as to generate value for at least one of the groups” 
5. The players in this market do not provide traditional goods or services but simply provide an 
avenue where the parties to a transaction can meet, interact, and transact. They do not own the 
infrastructure for producing or providing goods and services to consumers. For example, the 
products and services offered by Alibaba, Amazon, and Daraz are owned by third-party sellers, 
while Uber, the world’s biggest taxi company, owns no vehicles. For purposes of competition law, 
digital platforms are multi-sided technologies that internalize externalities by cross-subsidizing 
effectively between two or more categories of end-users that are parties to a transaction, or in other 
words “cybermediaries” 8.
 9 Hylton KN. Digital Platforms and Antitrust Law. SSRN Electronic Journal. 2019; 1-21. 
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 It does not encompass online markets developed by brick and mortar businesses to sell the 
products and services they produce. Digital platforms include activities and services such as search 
engines, social networking, payment systems, and marketplaces.  
Digital platforms provide their services at zero costs in exchange user data 9.  They have 
developed complex algorithms to process the data, and decisions are based on that data. As such, 
the platforms require enormous initial investments or sunk costs but have low marginal costs 10. 
This is because the technological systems required to collect, store, and process data can be costly, 
but once implemented, the marginal costs associated with additional data are low 11. Due to the 
high sunk costs and thus, high economies of scale and scope, natural barriers to entry into digital 
markets exist and the market is concentrated within the hands of a few players, or superplatforms. 
Secondly, in multi-sided markets, services are provided for free to one customer group. The links 
created between two or more sides enables the platform to charge one group of customers and use 
the revenues to provide services to another user group for zero price 4. This calls for legislative 
clarification whether such services fall under the purview of antitrust law.  
Additionally, since there is an indirect network between suppliers of goods and services 
and consumers within the platform, then there exists an antitrust market regardless of whether one 
or more platform users are charged 10. Another feature of online platforms is data-driven network 
effects 12. This refers to the effect created by the use of one party on the value of the service to 
existing or potential users. For instance, a person may use Facebook or shop on Amazon because 
their friends do so. It, therefore, follows that the size and number of users determine the value of 
the platform. These cross-network effects create feedback loops that can make it difficult for new 
platforms with a small user base to compete against incumbents with millions or even billions of 
users 13.
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The large economies of scope and scale, data control, and network effects create barriers 
to entry, a phenomenon which has facilitated the rise of giant digital companies such as Alibaba, 
Amazon, Facebook, and Google. New entrants lack the advantage of “big data” and this poses a 
great challenge for small companies in establishing large and successful platforms 14. Furthermore, 
the dominant digital platforms prioritize user base maximization to profit maximization. Start-ups 
with insufficient capital are not able to sustain themselves to growth with such a business strategy. 
Even if they overcome these challenges, they are acquired by the incumbents before they can 
become potential competitive threats.  
 
3. Challenges of Digital Platforms in the Context of Pakistani Competition Law 
The first problem of tech companies to the antitrust framework in Pakistan relates to the 
determination of the relevant market. The purpose of market definition is to establish whether there 
is a need for ex-ante regulation, which may arise if a firm’s activities are not constrained by 
potential or existing competitors, or if consumers cannot easily switch between competitive 
products. It provides a framework in which “the competitive aspects of anti-competitive 
agreements, abuses of dominance, mergers, or the need for regulation can be analyzed.” 
The Act defines the relevant market as “the market which shall be determined by the 
Commission with reference to a product market and geographic market. A product market 
comprises all those products or services that are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by 
consumers because of the product’s characteristics, prices, and intended uses. A geographic market 
comprises the area in which the conditions of competition are sufficiently homogeneous and which 
can be distinguished from neighboring geographic areas because, in particular, the conditions of 
competition are appreciably different in those areas.” While this definition is inherently applicable 
to traditional business models, it is unclear whether each side of multi-sided platforms should be 
treated as a separate market. The relevant market for digital companies does not coincide with the 
technologies or products offered by the firms. Moreover, the innovative and dynamic nature of 
digital markets make it difficult to assess competitive restraints.  
The Pakistani law deals only with demand-side substitutionality and makes no reference to 
supply-side substitution 15. The consideration of potential supply-side substitutionality (whether 
supply by other firms is technologically feasible) is crucial in investigating abuse of dominance 
cases and in reviewing mergers. 
  11 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Competition Issues in the 
Digital Economy (Report of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and 
Policy, Eighteenth Session Geneva, 2019; 10–12 July  
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Regarding demand-side substitution, changing customer preferences and the absence of 
well-established consumer views on product interchangeability make it challenging for 
competition authorities to determine which products and services are considered viable alternatives 
or substitutes 14. As opposed to traditional industries where products with similar characteristics 
often comprise a market, the digital ecosystem is composed of a range of product and/or services 
which consumers may regard as substitutes 12. Some competition authorities have stipulated 
guidelines in defining what constitutes a market for digital markets such as the U.S. Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) guidelines which state that “the relevant market need not have precise metes 
and bounds 11.” The Pakistani competition law and guidelines have no such provisions.  
The reliance on the price mechanism as an indicator of consumer welfare may also not be 
applicable to digital markets. Due to the significant network effects and economies of scale, the 
firms offer their services to consumers “free of charge” 15. The other side of the market (the supply 
side – advertisers) bears the full burden of generating profits. Competition in digital markets is 
based on factors other than price such as product features, quality, and functionality. The 
traditional substantive tests cannot, therefore, be applied. The CCP should redefine the market by 
introducing guidelines that recognize the free products or services offered by online platforms. It 
is also noteworthy that since the platforms offer their services in exchange for consumer data, 
large-scale data gathering by players is a major source of market power and may have potential 
anti-competitive implications. The Commission should consider the significance of the scale and 
scope of data for competitive performance or institute data valuation mechanisms in its assessment. 
 3 Wilson J. Crossing the Crossroads: Making Competition Law Effective in Pakistan. Loyola 
University Chicago International Law Review, 2011; 8(2). Available from: 
https://lawecommons.luc.edu/lucilr/vol8/iss2/2/ 
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Once firms in digital markets attain a dominant position, they have the ability to stifle 
innovation and competition by smaller firms within the same market by leveraging their market 
power 9. Dominant firms, which often exhibit monopolistic tendencies, lock in end- users at both 
sides of the platform thereby making themselves indispensable  16. Additionally, attempts by 
smaller firms to attain relevant market positions are thwarted by the incumbents through pre-
emptive mergers – aimed at preventing the targets from becoming a competitive threat.  
4. Merger Review in Pakistan 
Mergers entail the restructuring of undertakings to achieve growth and efficiency for the 
benefit of consumers 12. This is important for competition law and policy because the ultimate goal 
of competition law is to maximize consumer welfare. Thus, merger review constitutes a different 
class of competition law that often result in market detriment. The merger review process in 
Pakistan is ex-ante, implying that mergers are reviewed based on probabilities of their market 
effects 3. Thus, at the time of review, these effects have not manifested themselves this presents a 
challenge. A poor evaluation of a proposed merger may lead to the clearance of a merger with anti-
competitive effects on the market such as exclusionary effects or abuse of dominance if the post-
merger entity is a dominant player. Also, a merger with potential benefits to consumers may be 
prohibited. The challenge of ex-ante review is even more present in the review of digital mergers 
14. Therefore, it is important for the competition authority to have a comprehensive understanding 
of the markets involved, and have sufficient tools at its disposal to effectively analyze digital 
mergers. 
 
 
 11 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Competition Issues in the 
Digital Economy (Report of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and 
Policy, Eighteenth Session Geneva, 2019; 10–12 July  
 
The Pakistani competition law captures only proposed mergers that meet the notification 
thresholds, based on turnover or asset value. In the digital industry where dominant incumbents 
acquire small fast-growing companies in different, the asset or turnover thresholds may not always 
be met and this results in the failure to review mergers that may have significant anti-competitive 
effects in the market on procedural grounds. As it will be discussed later in this paper, it is crucial 
that the CCP adopts transaction-based thresholds or issues guidelines that require mergers that do 
not meet the notification thresholds but which raise significant competition concerns be notified 
to the Commission.  
5. Data and Empirical Analysis 
5.1 CCP’s Merger Review Activity 
In our empirical analysis, we consider the mergers and acquisitions processed by the 
Commission since its inception in 2010 to 2019. The Commission processed a total of 710 
applications between this period. Table 1 shows the number of M&A reviewed by the Commission 
on an annual basis.  
Table 1: Merger and acquisition reviewed by commission 
Year Phase I Review Phase II Review Total 
2011 81 3 84 
2012 73 4 77 
2013 66 6 72 
2014 81 5 86 
2015 78 3 81 
2016 64 5 69 
2017 85 2 87 
2018 68 5 73 
2019 74 7 81 
Total 670 40 710 
 
The graph represents the CCP’s performance for the period 2010 – 2019.  
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Figure 1: The graph represents the CCP’s performance for the period 2010 – 2019.  
The number of transactions approved without conditions, subject to conditions, and not approved 
are as shown in Table 2.  
Table 2: Transactions approved with or without conditions 
 
 
 
5. 2 Classification Criteria of Digital Mergers 
For the purposes of our analysis, a merger falls into the digital economy category if (i) it 
meets the specific criteria of digital platforms described above including but not limited to search 
engines, online marketplaces, ride-sharing applications, payment systems, and social networking; 
(ii) if both the acquirer and target are digital platforms. Based on these criteria, only 4 mergers in 
the digital economy were identified as provided in Table3.  
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Table 3: Identification of mergers in digital platforms 
Acquiring Firm Target 
Year of 
Acquisition 
Approved 
without 
Conditions 
Approved with 
Restrictions 
Alibaba Singapore 
Holding (PVT.) LTD 
JADE E-
SERVICES 
PAKISTAN 
(PVT.) 
2018 Yes - 
Hero 
Food Panda 
Pakistan 
(PVT.) LTD 
2016 Yes - 
Alibaba Daraz 
Pakistan 
(PVT.) LTD 
2018 - - 
Uber Inc.  Careem 
(PVT.) LTD 
2020 Yes  - 
 
5.3 Data Collection, Methodology, and Model Specification 
5.3.1 Data Collection 
To compare the explanatory factors on M&A intervention by the CCP in the traditional 
and digital industries, we examined the public database of Pakistani mergers publicly available on 
the CCP’s website (www.cc.gov.pk) covering 710 decisions from January 2011 to December 
2019. Due to the small number of decisions in the digital sector, we constructed a random sample 
of 74 firms in the traditional industry to provide a more robust comparative model. All of the 
Commissions interventions in the digital economy were considered. The data includes the outcome 
of the CCP’s final decision (dependent variable intervention). Since the outcome is ordered and 
discrete, we assign the arbitrary values of ‘0’ if the CCP approved the merger without restrictions 
and ‘1’ if the CCP disapproved the merger or approved with remedies regardless of whether the 
case involved a second phase review.   
5.3.2 Model Specification 
We estimate an ordered Probit model controlling for the year and month of decisions. A 
Probit model is expressed as p = P [Z≤β0 + β1.X] = F (β0 + β1.X) where xn are the explanatory 
variables and βn are the parameters of the explanatory variables, and with a probability curve p in 
the range [0,1]. Estimations are by the maximum likelihood method. The explanatory variables 
and parameters include industry, relevant market, geographic market, domestic acquirer (‘1’ if the 
acquirer is Pakistani and ‘0’ otherwise), domestic target (‘1’ if target is Pakistani and ‘0’ 
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otherwise), barriers to entry, substitutes and existence of an undertaking. The CCP does not 
provide information about market shares and we have no way to obtain and quantify this 
information. Subsequently, the combined market share was omitted from the model.  
The analysis uses two sets of data, distinguished by the acquiring industry. These include 
traditional economy sample (Model 1) and digital economy sample (Model 2). This classification 
enables the comparison of the factors that explain the Commission’s decisions in the digital 
economy vis-a-vis the traditional economy. Our Probit model makes the following considerations: 
(i) If an explanatory factor is statistically significant for model 2 but is not for the other 
industries; and 
(ii) If the factor is statistically significant for other industries but is not for the digital 
economy (model 1), there is evidence of distinction in the way the CCP deals with 
digital economy mergers.  
5.4 Empirical Results and Discussion 
Table 4 provides the descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables.  
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables 
  
Relevant 
market 
Geographic 
market 
Barriers 
to entry 
Substitutes Existence of 
an 
undertaking 
Domestic 
Target  
Domestic 
Acquirer 
Mean 0.89 0.56 0.62 1.26 0.56 0.62 0.49 
Standard Error 0.11 0.18 0.62 0.37 0.18 0.21 0.54 
Standard 
Deviation 0.33 0.53 1.87 1.10 0.53 0.16 0.26 
Sample 
Variance 0.11 0.28 3.49 1.21 0.28 0.32 2.58 
Minimum 0.00 0.00 -2.23 -1.53 0.00 -1.22 0.00 
Maximum 1.00 1.00 2.45 2.22 1.00 1.00 1.45 
Confidence 
Level(95.0%) 0.26 0.41 1.44 0.84 0.41 0.53 0.21 
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The results of our probit models are as shown in Table 5. 
Table 5: Results of probit models 
Variable 
Traditional Economy Sample Digital Economy Sample 
  Model 1 (n=77) Model 2 (n=3) 
Relevant market -0.02 0.01 
  -0.05 -0.11 
Geographic market 0.2 0.04 
  0.03 -0.02 
Barriers to entry -0.05 0.28 
  0.44 -0.05 
Substitutes 0.00 0.02 
  0.00 -0.01 
Existence of an undertaking -1.39 0.16 
  0.42 0.15 
Pakistani Target 0.07 -0.16 
  -0.25 0.37 
Pakistani Acquirer -0.38 -1.1 
  -1.6 -0.85 
 
Model 1 reveals that relevant market (β=-0.02, p=-0.05), geographical market (β=0.2, 
p=0.03), barriers to entry (β=-0.05, p=0.44) and existence of an undertaking (β-1.39, p=0.42), 
Pakistani target (β=0.07, p=-0.25), and Pakistani acquirer (β=-0.38, p=-1.6) are statistically 
significant. Substitutes (β=0.00, p=0) are not statistically significant. For model 2, relevant market 
(β=0.01, p=-0.11), geographical market (β=0.04, p=-0.02), substitutes (β=0.02, p=-0.01) and 
existence of an undertaking (β=0.16, p=0.15), Pakistani target (β=-0.16, p=0.37), and Pakistani 
acquirer (β=-1.1, p=-0.85) are statistically significant.  
The results show that the relevant market, geographical market, entry barriers and Pakistani 
target have significant explanatory power on the CCP’s merger decisions regardless of the industry 
under analysis. The existence of an undertaking and Pakistani acquirer explain intervention in both 
the traditional and digital industries. While substitutes have little or no influential effect on merger 
decision outcomes in the traditional industry, they are relevant in determining the outcome of 
merger review decision in the digital economy. In sum, the results show no evidence on distinctive 
aspects that influence the CCP’s decisions on merger reviews in the digital economy versus the 
traditional industries. 
 11 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Competition Issues in the 
Digital Economy (Report of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and 
Policy, Eighteenth Session Geneva, 2019; 10–12 July  
 
5.5 Correlation Matrix 
To improve the reliability of our findings by avoiding multicollinearity bias, we compute 
the correlation matrix as shown in Table 6 below. It can be observed that the product market and 
geographic markets are highly correlated with the CCP’s intervention in the intended merger. 
Similarly, barriers to entry, existence of an undertaking, and the nationality of the target (Pakistani 
or otherwise) also significantly influence the CCP’s decision to intervene. 
Table 6: Correlation matrix 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Intervention (1) 
1.00        
Product market (2) 0.29 1.00       
Geographic market (3) 0.19 0.03 1.00      
Barriers to entry (4) 0.13 0.11 0.05 1.00     
Substitutes (5) 
0.05 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 1.00    
Existence of an undertaking (6) 0.12 0.08 0.40 0.27 0.16 1.00   
Pakistani Target (7) 0.30 -0.18 0.22 0.16 -0.11 -0.24 1.00  
Pakistani Acquirer (8) 0.00 0.02 -0.19 0.05 -0.06 0.04 1.00 1.00 
 
6. Recommendations and Conclusion 
The overarching goal of competition policies around the world is to prevent economic 
agents from abusing their economic power in order to maintain and enhance consumer welfare 11. 
While most antitrust policies have been effective in curbing anti-competitive behavior for tangible 
goods and services markets, the new information economy has imposed challenges to many 
competition authorities including the Pakistani competition commission.
 9 Hylton KN. Digital Platforms and Antitrust Law. SSRN Electronic Journal. 2019; 1-21. 
 11 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Competition Issues in the 
Digital Economy (Report of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and 
Policy, Eighteenth Session Geneva, 2019; 10–12 July  
 15 Lundqvist B, Gal, MS. Competition Law for the Digital Economy. Gloucestershire, England: 
Edward Elgar Publishing. 2019. 
16 OECD, Merger Control in Dynamic Markets. 2020. Available from: 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/merger-control-in-dynamic-markets.htm 
 
 In recent months, a consensus has developed among competition law scholars, economists, 
and policy makers that the current anti-trust policy framework should be remodeled to effectively 
deal with the problems of platform ecosystems to strengthen competition in digital markets 9;15-16. 
This paper investigates whether there is shift in how competition authorities in developing 
countries approach mergers in the digital sector by empirically evaluating whether the 
determinants of merger review decisions in the traditional economy also determine merger review 
decisions in the digital economy. More specifically: Are merger review decisions in the digital 
market by the CCP explained by the same explanatory factors as for the traditional industry? To 
answer this question, we examine seven potential concepts associated with the traditional theories 
of competition and regulation. We develop seven Probit regressions and a sample of 77 mergers 
in both sectors of the economy processed by the Commission between 2011 and 2017. Our analysis 
provides evidence that nearly all determinants (with the exception of substitutes) of merger 
decisions in traditional markets also inform merger review decisions in the digital platform market. 
In general terms, there is no distinction in how the CCP deals with digital mergers. 
 To ensure competitive markets across the economy, the Pakistani competition law and 
policy needs to adopt to the market realities of digital business models. The consumer welfare 
standard approach based on the price mechanism in insufficient, if not inapplicable, to digital 
platforms. UNCTAD 11 states that this framework ignores practices such as predatory pricing 
which are rampant in the digital sector. Dominant platforms, particularly such as Alibaba, Google, 
and Facebook, may lower their prices in the short to medium term, but once they achieve a 
monopoly position in the market, prices increase in an already limited choice environment. 
Additionally, personalized pricing by digital platforms and rapidly changing prices pose a 
difficulty in analyzing prices of online platforms providing marketplace infrastructure 15. 
Furthermore, price analysis is not the most suitable standard of assessing the pro- and anti-
competitive effects of digital platforms in the absence of given that they offer their services for 
free. Since, in fact, they provide services in exchange of consumers’ personal data, digital mergers 
may result in consumer harm in forms other than price. As UNCTAD 11 posits, “consume welfare 
should be broadened to include other criteria such as consumer privacy and choice, personal data 
protection, switching costs, and the lock-in effects of online platforms.”
 5 Crémer J, Montjoye YA, Schweitzer H.  Directorate-General for Competition (European 
Commission). Competition policy for the Digital Era. 2019. Available from: 
https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/21dc175c-7b76-11e9-9f05-
01aa75ed71a1/language-en 
 17 Geradin D. What should EU competition policy do to address the concerns raised by the digital 
platforms’ market power? SSRN Electronic Journal. 2018. 1-14. 
18 Koenig C. Germany ∙ Digital Economy, Antitrust Damages, and More: The 9th Amendment to 
the German competition act. European Competition and Regulatory Law Review, 2017; 1(3): 261-
265.  
 
 
 The increasing role of data as an important component of the digital market has also not 
been factored in Pakistani competition law. Digital platforms generate value from processing data 
collected “on the basis of free input of the platform users” 17. They do not trade data as a stand-
alone product but use to improve the services offered on the platform. For the digital industry, data 
is a form of “specialized asset,” and competition policy should, therefore, regard it as sui generis 
information relevant for competition law purposes 5. Pakistan has several laws in place that govern 
the collection, use, and protection of consumer data including the Personal Data Protection Act 
2019 and the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act 2016. There is also sector-specific legislation 
that impact data protection such as the Payment Systems and Electronic Funds Transfer Act 2007 
that provides for the protection of customer information held by financial institutions and the 
Telecom Consumers Protection Regulations 2009, governing the use of subscribers’ personal data. 
However, there are no legal provisions for the use of data by digital platforms. Moreover, 
enforcement of such provisions would require close collaboration between the CPP and the 
National Commission for Personal Data Protection. The CCP should develop guidelines or amend 
the Merger Control Regulations (2016) to include the protection and the control over the use of 
data by undertakings, ex post. Regulating data use in the industry with regard to the portability of 
data over platforms, open data, and revising the existing data protection legal frameworks currently 
in force would also promote the uptake of digital start-ups that rely on big data for growth.  
The competition legislation also needs to redefine the relevant market for digital platforms 
to include factors beyond the product and geographic markets. With regard to the multi-sided 
nature of digital platforms, it is not clear whether the demand and supply sides should be treated 
as separate markets. Consumers, content providers, and advertisers do not engage with other on 
the platform due to different degrees of substitutionality on each side of the platform and this may 
give rise to consumer harm. For example, search engines and social networks may be viewed as 
substitutes by advertisers but are not by consumers. The current definition does not take into 
account the free nature of goods provided by digital platforms. Whole some European competition 
authorities such as Germany’s Federal Cartel Office (FTO) have developed a digital-industry 
specific relevant market definition 18, developing countries such as Pakistan are yet to adopt such 
provisions. Concerning data, the antitrust law should also define a wider market for data. As earlier 
proposed, data is a form of specialized asset for digital platforms. Creating a “data market” would 
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enable market players to compete for the asset that is used as an input to develop or improved the 
services provided by digital platforms.  
As in many other jurisdictions, the Pakistani competition law requires only mergers 
fulfilling the turnover and/or asset thresholds to notify the commission of an intended merger. In 
the digital market, dominant platforms acquire small start-ups with low turnovers or small asset 
bases. Thus, while the start-ups are highly valuable, they may be by the CCP without the necessary 
scrutiny. The Commission should address these concerns. The FTO, for example, added a new 
threshold in the German competition law for notification requirements by proposed digital 
mergers. In Germany, in addition to the word wide turnover threshold and the first domestic 
turnover threshold, transactions whose consideration exceed 400 million euros should be notified 
to the FTO 18. This captures the acquisition small innovative companies with less than the 5 million 
turnover domestic threshold but with high growth potential. In transactions where an incumbent 
acquires a quickly growing start-up that operates outside its market (“conglomeral transactions”), 
raises the question of whether stand-alone growth or M&A has more social value. Petit 19 proposes 
that the theory of harm should evolve to “think of the target firm as a horizontal competitor active 
within a same “technological space” or “user space.” As such, if it can be proven that the target 
can grow as a competitive force by itself if not acquired by the incumbent, then an acquisition by 
the incumbent should be prohibited.  
In conclusion, this paper provides empirical evidence that the Pakistani competition 
commission, in conducting merger reviews, does not treat digital mergers distinctively from 
mergers in the traditional industry. As theoretically evidenced in this paper, digital platforms are 
not only market disruptive but also raise important competition law issues that should be 
addressed. As UNCTAD 11 states, the ideal competition tools, including the competition authority, 
should detect and eliminate the potential competition restraints from mergers at the start rather 
than trying to correct anti-competitive outcomes ex post as the later may be difficult once a firm 
has already attained a monopoly position. Therefore, the CCP should push for legal amendments 
or develop separate competition policy guidelines for the digital market. As the Pakistani 
government spearheads a digital transformation campaign in the country, it is likely that tech start-
ups will increase in the coming years. Changes to the competition law framework should go hand 
in hand with the digital transformation agenda. 
 .  
 
7. Limitations and Future Research Direction 
Although this study is greatly important for competition law and policy for the digital sector 
in Pakistan, it has two major limitations which future research in the subject should address. First, 
the analysis did not include important factors associated with the competition policy theories. 
These include factors such as market shares and efficiency gains. This can be attributed to the use 
of secondary and public information. Thus, our models could not capture the relevance of these 
factors in explaining M&A interventions in the digital sector. In future, all the relevant factors for 
competition policy analysis should be considered. Secondly, the different sample sizes of the 
traditional and digital markets with a small size of the latter may have skewed the results towards 
the traditional market (Type II error) thereby decreasing the statistical power of the study and limit 
the generalizability of the sample to the digital sector population. A larger sample size for the 
digital and traditional sectors should be used in future to increase the generalizability of the results.  
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